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In a recent Opinion article, Sui and Hum-
phreys [1] argue that experimental ﬁndings
suggest self is ‘special’, in that self-refer-
ence serves a binding function within
human cognitive economy. Contrasting
their view with other functionalist posi-
tions, chieﬂy Dennett's [2], they deny that
self is a convenient ﬁction and adduce
ﬁndings to show that a ‘core self repre-
sentation’ serves as an ‘integrative glue’
helping to bind distinct types of informa-
tion as well as distinct stages of psycho-
logical processing. In other words, where
Dennett regards self as analogous to a
center of gravity, a simpliﬁcation posited
by observers, Sui and Humphreys regard
self as a function that modulates mental
processes. In practice, however, the con-
cept of ‘self’ they employ is not unlike
Dennett's.
We side with Sui and Humphreys in hold-
ing that self-reference modulates mental
processes: reference to self during a task
can bind memory to source, increase per-
ceptual integration, and link attention to
decision making, among other things.
What is more, these functions are not
reducible to other factors such as seman-
tic coding, familiarity, or reward [3]. But
whereas Sui and Humphreys contribute
important empirical detail, the binding
functions they describe are compatible
with Dennett's version of functionalism,
which treats self as an artifact of social
process.
The problem is that the research they
highlight resembles the social process
view in critical respects, making self
appear nearly as insubstantial as a center
of gravity. Note that, according to Sui and
Humphreys, binding functions are evoked
when stimuli that are stipulated by experi-
menters to be self-related, and that seem
to ‘enhance’ coupling among certain brain
regions, are introduced by those experi-
menters within tasks. Here, as with social
processes, what matters most is activity
that is driven by the designs of other per-
sons and by extrinsic stimuli. But a focus
on extrinsic stimuli of this sort that entrain
ongoing, integrative mental functions can
make self seem derivative of social pro-
cess, leaving it without a momentum or
trajectory of its own, subject to lapses
when those processes are absent. It is
in this respect that the Sui and Humphreys
concept of ‘self’ is scarcely distinguishable
from Dennett's.
Self is less evanescent and more substan-
tial than this view suggests. Indeed, Sui
and Humphreys do intimate an approach
better suited to explaining self with their
observation that, when the perigenual
anterior cingulate cortex (PACC) is taken
as seed, resting state (RS) activity in the
anterior cortical midline structure (aCMS)
bears similarities to neuronal activity that
occurs when participants respond to self-
related stimuli. To go beyond identifying a
function for self and explain how it per-
forms that function – to identify wherefrom
it derives its trajectory – this observation
about the RS warrants scrupulous
attention.
We submit that this similarity of pattern
affords a unique opportunity to investigate
self's neural correlates and preconditions,
because neuronal ﬂuctuations can
thereby be studied in relative isolation from
the social process of responding to exper-
imental tasks. By directing attention to the
RS and other pre-stimulus states, prog-
ress can be made on identifying the rele-
vant regional, temporal, and biochemical
patterns that mediate self. Our point is not
that the RS is pristine, untouched by social
process [4]; instead, it is that the RS is
neither inert nor incapable of sustaining
self. On the contrary, the relevant
spontaneous neuronal ﬂuctuations
actively shape how stimuli are perceived
and interpreted [5,6], and, by concentrat-
ing on this shaping process, we can see
that self has momentum and trajectory
that do not lapse in the absence of exter-
nal stimuli.
To illustrate this line of investigation, par-
ticipants were asked to indicate whether
emotional photographs were self-related
[7]. We discovered that the degree of low-
frequency alpha power (8–9 Hz) – even
before the photographs were presented
– could predict the degree of self-related-
ness. That is, a higher degree of alpha
power disposes participants to experi-
ence pictures as more self-related; a lower
degree, as less. In addition, we discovered
that the higher the subject's RS concen-
tration of PACC glutamate, the greater the
pre-stimulus low alpha power difference
between high and low self-relatedness.
These ﬁndings suggest that PACC gluta-
mate can predispose subjects to sponta-
neous ﬂuctuations in frequencies, like low
alpha, which in turn predisposes those
subjects to perceiving stimuli as self-
related.
The discovery that RS and pre-stimulus
activity shape self-experience creates
opportunities for investigating how self
accomplishes integration and other func-
tions, in a way that controls for confound-
ing effects of social process. Controlling
for the effects of those processes makes
possible the development of a more com-
prehensive, untrammeled understanding
of self, one that informs about the con-
tents of experience most intimately asso-
ciated with self [8,9], the binding function
when self is absent [10], and circumstan-
ces wherein self obstructs rather than
binds [11,12]. Sui and Humphreys's afﬁr-
mation that the ‘self’ concept can play a
functional role is insufﬁcient to distinguish
their position from Dennett's. Progress on
explaining what is special about self
requires scrutiny of intrinsic, spontaneous
activity. By attending to that activity we
can begin to trace the trajectory of self.
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Self-Reference Acts
as a Golden Thread
in Binding
Jie Sui1,*
In a recent article in this journal,
Glyn Humphreys and I proposed
a model of how self-reference
enhances binding in perception
and cognition [1]. We showed
that self-reference changes partic-
ular functional processes; notably,
self-reference increases binding
between the features of stimuli
and between different stages of
processing. Lane and colleagues
[2] provide an interesting comment
on our article that suggests our
theory of self-reference is compat-
ible with Dennett's philosophical
perspective on the narrative nature
of the self. Although the nature
of the self has attracted the
attention of both philosophers
and scientists, the two disciplines
have generated different perspec-
tives on the functions of the self,
largely due to their different meth-
odologies. For example, Dennett
argues that the self is constituted
through human narration on expe-
rience [3]. By contrast, work from
psychologists and cognitive neuro-
scientists focuses on the functional
and neural mechanisms of self-
reference.
Hermeneutical Interpretations
versus Mechanistic Evidence on
the Integrative Self
The traditional argument of the narrative
self in philosophy emphasizes its
dependence on narrative and agency
(selves are primarily agents, and agents
are understood best in narrative rather
than naturalistic terms), although some
philosophers are in favor of a binding func-
tion for the self (i.e., the concept of center
of gravity is not limited to a description).
We focus on the mechanistic proﬁle of self:
that the self plays the special role of
enhancing the binding of information
and psychological processes in human
beings. The binding function can be
parameterized using mathematical mod-
els as well as empirical manipulations.
For example, when individuals perceive
multiple external stimuli associated with
themselves, the capacity of information
processing can be measured using a
capacity coefﬁcient [C(t)] indexing how
one responds to the whole conﬁguration
of all stimuli rather than the sum of the
parts [4]. We argue that self-reference
operates as a perceptual glue to bind
external stimuli together when facing a
complex environment.
Self-Reference Acts as a Golden
Thread in the Brain and Mind
Lane and colleagues [2] argue that, on a
practical level, Dennett and psychologists
like us treat self as an artifact of social
processes. Indeed, the mechanistic per-
spective of self-reference has been sup-
ported by evidence occurring when
people make reference to the self within
the task that they are performing. How-
ever, one virtue of these manipulations is
that they allowed us to test whether there
is a speciﬁc neural circuit in the brain to
support self-reference relative to other-
reference. This line of research could pro-
vide valuable insight into whether the self is
an illusion, a commonly accepted view in
philosophy. Substantial evidence shows
that thinking in relation to the self strongly
activates the ventral medial prefrontal cor-
tex (vmPFC) [5]. As we discuss in our
article, researchers claim that the vmPFC
is associated with self-representation in
the brain [1]. We argue that the vmPFC
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